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STATIC HISTORY AND BRITTLE JURISPRUDENCE:
RAOUL BERGER AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY'
ROBERT J. COTTROL *
No constitutional development has had a more profound impact on the lives and
sensibilities of ordinary Americans than the expansion of the Supreme Court's fourteenth
amendment jurisprudence since the Second World War. The seeds of the now familiar
post-war constitutional revolution were sown long before the Court's 1954 decision in
Brown a. the Board of Education of Topeka Kansas•' created large scale public awareness of
new directions in the Court's jurisprudence. Brown helped usher in not only a new era in
American race relations but also a new public realization that state actions directed
towards individuals would receive a more thorough examination by the federal courts.
That realization, welcome to some, anathema to others, has helped reshape and intensify
a debate older than the Constitution itself. Since Brown, there has been a sustained
popular interest in the workings of the Court rarely matched during other periods in
American history."' While the Court has rarely, in its history, suffered from a lack of either
popular or professional critics, the Supreme Court's post-war examinations of state
abridgment of individual rights has struck some of the most intimate nerves in the
American body politic. If the court's decisions in race relations, 3 school prayer,' criminal
justice,5 abortions and other areas have represented a necessary expansion of liberties to
many, these pronouncements have, to others, meant an interference in local, democratic
prerogative, an unwarranted intrusion by a Supreme Court anxious to present personal
belief as constitutional mandate.
t Copyright © 1985 Boston College Law School.
* A.B. 1971, Ph.D. 1978, Yale University; J.D. 1984, Georgetown University Law Center;
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank the following
individuals for providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article: Mark Tushnet, George
Brown, Charles Baron, Emily Holcombe, Zygmunt Plater, David Keyser, Paul Finkleman, and
William S. McFeely. The author also acknowledges the valuable research assistance provided by
Barbara Cardone, A.B. 1982 Georgetown University, J.D. 1985 Boston College Law School, and the
editorial assistance of the staff of the Boston College Law Review.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
• The amount of popular commentary on the Warren and Burger Courts has been extensive,
far too extensive to discuss here. It is significant that within the last decade the Supreme Court has
been the subject of a highly popular journalistic expose, B. WOODWARD AND S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE BRETHREN), and a stage and screen play, First Monday In
October. (Paramount 1981). The commercial success of both works attests to the high degree of public
interest in the inner workings, real or imagined, of the Court.
• Since the Second World War, the Supreme Court has struck down state legislation mandating
segregated school systems, see Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
supplemented 349 U.S. 294 (1955), has declared that anti-miscegenation statutes are unconstitutional,
see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and has also addressed the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs, see, Regents of the. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
• See, e.g.. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
• See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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Raoul Berger' presents the latter view. In Government B y Judiciary: The Transformation
of the Fourteenth Amendments and Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course , 9 Berger
has taken aim at both the Warren and Burger courts, asserting that both have fundamen-
tally exceeded their constitutional mandates, usurping decisionmaking power that is
properly, indeed constitutionally, left to legislative bodies. Berger's critique is less a
recitation of quarrels with individual decisions, though these two studies are not lacking in
such disagreements, than it is an assault on the Court's decisionmaking processes. The
Court, for Berger, has ignored or, perhaps even worse, distorted history. In Berger's view
this distortion is a fatal flaw, a cardinal sin in a Court whose existence and power can only
he justified by its strict adherence to the intentions of the Constitution's framers.
Berger's argument, steeped in historical detail, is designed to demonstrate the dis-
tance the -Court. has strayed from the original intentions of the Constitution's framers. His
argument is an argument from first principles, a belief that neither desirability, nor
indeed necessity of result, nor even the now established precedential value of Warren and
Burger Court decisions, justifies what he views as a continued failure to recognize and
give strict effect to the intentions of the framers of constitutional provisions.' 0 As such,
Berger's writings constitute a brief for a methodology of constitutional interpretation," a
methodology fundamentally at odds with beliefs, long nurtured by the Court, of an
evolving Constitution adaptable to a changing social environment, realizable by a syn-
cretization of common-law reasoning proCesses with constitutional text.
This article examines Government By Judiciary and Death Penalties. Like Berger, this
author assumes that historical examination is critical to the process of constitutional
interpretation' and that the intentions of original framers must be given due effect. This
essay will argue, however, that Berger's works are limited, perhaps fatally so, by a
historical sensibility too narrowly focused to produce either a holistically accurate picture
of the intent of constitutional framers or a workable derivative jurisprudence. This article
will demonstrate that the framers of constitutional provisions, particularly the framers of
the fOurteenth amendment, recognized that they were laying a constitutional foundation
on which the courts would develop doctrine, informed but not shackled by the necessarily
7 Raoul Berger is a retired Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History at Harvard
Law School.
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY].
R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982) [hereinafter
cited as DEATH PENALTIES].
I{) GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8; DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9.
" Berger's approach is generally cited as an example of that constitutional strategy called
interpretivism. While that description is certainly accurate, this author would argue that Berger
presents a peculiarly rigid variant of the interpretivist school. While interpretivism posits the
necessity for the Court to confine its decisions to explicit or clearly implicit values in the written
Constitution, Berger carries the process a step further. His methodology would not merely confine
the Court to the framer's values, but to the specific problems the framers meant to address. For
example, with Berger's analysis, there would be no room for the Court to develop corollaries of
constitutional values such as the author outlines. See infra text accompanying notes 224-70. For two
discussions of interpretivism, see Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND,
L.J. 399 (1978), and Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983).
' Many of Berger's critics have been too willing to concede his essential historical accuracy. See,
e.g., Perry, Book Review, 78 Comm. L. REV. 685-86 (1978). The discussion developed infra text
accompanying notes 137-223, points out some of the deficiencies in Berger's historical argument.
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narrow focuses of the drafters. This essay will be less a point by point critique of Berger's
views on different cases than a critical examination of his uses of history in building his
jurisprudence. The first part of this article contains a presentation of Berger's main
arguments in both books. In the second part of the article, common-law reasoning within
the context of the American Constitution is examined. The third part of the article
provides a history against which the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment may be interpreted. Brown is examined as a necessary corollary of the fourteenth
amendment in the fourth part of the article. Berger's view of the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment. clause is critiqued in the fifth part of the article. The essay
concludes with an overall critique of Berger's views in the sixth part of the article.
THE BERGER THESIS
Berger believes the Court has severely distorted the fourteenth amenchnent." Criti-
cal to the thesis in both Gtruernment By Judiciary and Death Penalties is the idea that the
amendment's framers had narrow objectives that cannot legitimately be reconciled with
the liberal constructions of the Warren and Burger Courts." Berger's framers were
limited men. Products of a mid-nineteenth century American culture that was at once
both strongly Negrophobic and fiercely jealous of state prerogatives, they sought. no
radical alteration of either the status of blacks or of federal-state relations.'' Aside from a
radical minority, the fourteenth amendment's framers were simply interested in insuring
a bare minimum of' rights to the freedman.'" That minimum of rights, designed to
provide a prophylactic against southern attempts virtually to re-enslave the freedmen
through the use of the Black Codes," was meant to insure that the hard-won Union
victory would not be thwarted by legal schemes designed to reinvigorate the South's
moribund peculiar institution,'"
For Berger, the principal, indeed the sole purpose, of the fourteenth amendment
was to remove doubts concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.' In Goverinment By Judiciary,  Berger argues that that act was narrowly drawn with
13 Berger sets forth his view of the limited purposes of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment early in both works. See GOVERNMENT' BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10-19 and DEATH
PENALTIES, supra note 9, at 15-28. For further elaboration of Berger's thesis see infra text accompany-
ing notes 14-98.
14 See GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10-19; DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9. at
15-28.
15 See GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10-19; DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, at
15-28.
11;
	 GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10-19; DEATH PENALTIES, Supra note 9, at
15-28.
17 See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, Supra note 8, at 10-19, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, at
15-28. The Black Codes were statutes enacted by southern Legislatures in 1865 and 1866. Designed to
insure that the newly freed blacks would continue to provide labor for plantations and other
enterprises, these codes made heavy use of vagrancy laws and forced labor contracts to coerce black
labor. These laws were also designed to enforce a caste -like subordination. Blacks were subject to
strict curfews. Under these statutes, the freedmen were not permitted to possess firearms and they
had strict limitations on their rights to speak in public. Historian John Hope Franklin argues that
these measures were, in effect, a continuation of the antebellum slave codes. See J.H. FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY To FREEDOM: A His-roRv OF NEGRO AMERICANS 232 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM],
15 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, Supra note 8, at 22-36.
ig
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limited objectives? That act, according to Berger, was designed to confer a specific set of
civil rights on the freedmen.' The statute declared blacks citizens.' It allowed blacks to
testify and sue in court, abolishing the legal disabilities common in the former slave
states." The act prohibited states from abridging the privileges and immunities of the
freedmen,'" Those privileges and immunities were not extensive, in Berger's view they
simply served to insure fundamental rights, life, liberty, and the right to acquire, use and
dispose of property.' The meager civil rights agenda of 1866 contemplated neither
political rights nor social equality for the freedman.'"
But even that limited agenda was constitutionally -suspect? The Taney Court in Died
Scott a. Sandford" had cast serious doubt on black citizenship. And although Lincoln's
Attorney General, Edward Bates, had written a series of opinions during the Civil War
declaring that free blacks were citizens of the United States,'" the issue was still unresol-
ved. Congress' power to confer citizenship by legislation was suspect, as was its power to
grant other rights to blacks, an area that had previously been the exclusive province of
state governments?' Equally important. was the shift in political climate after Lincoln's
assassination. Andrew Johnson made little secret of his anti-black views' and his desire to
permit southern re-entry into the Union without federal interference on behalf of the
freedmen. 3' Even the limited Civil Rights Act of 1866 had to be passed over Johnson's
veto." The restoration of southern political rights could have caused the Act's repeal."
The fourteenth amendment was thus designed to overcome likely constitutional objec-
tions to the Civil Rights Act and to make it harder to repeal the newly acquired citizenship
and rights,'
Berger's view of the fburteenth amendment's limited purposes is derived from his
approach to the debates over the amendment's passage and his reading of the history of
racism in the United States. 36 That reading is grim. The original Constitution was racist.
20
21
 Id.
"
.13 Id .
21 Id.
17. id.
" Id.
27 Id .
▪ 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
• 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1862); f I Op. Att'y Gen. 37 (1864).
" GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARS", supra note 8, at 114.
3 ' See H. HymAN AND W. WIECEK, EQUAL. JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT. 1835-1875 303, 418, 453 (1982) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW]; E.
MCR1TRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960). For one interpretation that argues that
Andrew Johnson's racism may have backfired and contributed to increased support for egalitarian
measures in the thirty -ninth Congress see Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History. 54 N.V.U. L. REv. 651, 657 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Soifer]. In light of Berger's conten-
tion that there was little support for black suffrage during the thirty-ninth Congress, it is interesting
to note that by 1865, even Andrew Johnson gave lukewarm, private support to black suffrage in
southern states as a means of supporting Unionist politicians in southern states. See EQUAL. JusTice
UNDER LAw, ,itrpra, at 309.
32 See EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31. at 303, 418, 453.
33 GOVERNMENT By ,JUDICIARV, supra note 8, at 42.
34 Id. at 23.
"5 Id. at 22-36.
" Berger informs us that "the key to an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that
the North was shot through with Negrophobia, that the Republicans, except Jar a minority of extremists,
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and the subsequent history of the nation in the antebellum period served to enhance
rather than diminish that initial racism.37 Blacks were hated North as well as South and
the denials of rights to free blacks in the North were extensive. Segregation was the
norm." On the eve of the Civil War only a handful of New England states and New York
permitted black men to vote. 39 A number of western states had laws prohibiting black
settlement. ° Before the war, anti-abolition mobs routinely attacked blacks and
abolitionists.'l The states that the framers of the fourteenth amendment represented
were not prepared to accord equal rights to their black populations." Their representa-
tives were not prepared to impose such an equality on the nation."
Berger buttresses this view through his examination of the congressional debates
over the fourteenth amendment's passage. 4.' The framers knew the Radical Republican
agenda would not stand popular scrutiny." If men like Thaddeus Stevens, Charles
Sumner, or John A. Bingham had far reaching purposes, a desire to bring about a
political and social equality far in excess of what, in 1866, was politically feasible, calmer
heads among the Republican members of Congress prevailed.° Bound by the limits of the
possible, conscious that the amendment had to pass both a skeptical Congress and hostile
state legislatures, fearful of running against anti-black Democrats who would exploit even
conservative attempts at racial reform, Republican supporters of the fourteenth amend-
ment made it an amendment of conservative dimensions, a political compromise carefully
crafted to minimize offense." In an attempt to show the essentially conservative nature of
the fourteenth amendment, Berger devotes considerable space to a discussion designed to
prove that that amendment's framers did not support black suffrage.° As further evi-
dence of the conservative mood of the thirty-ninth Congress, Berger notes Congress'
rejection of Charles Sumner's efforts to abolish segregated schools in the District of
Columbia.•
Berger acknowledges that the debates contain material that might mislead the un-
wary into believing that the framers' intentions were somewhat broader." Opponents of
the amendment charged that its provisions would enfranchise the freedmen, require
social equality, and authorize miscegenation." But Berger cautions us that we should look
were swayed by the racism that gripped their constituents rather than by abolitionist ideology."
GOVERNMENT BY JuoicIARY,supra note 8, at 10 (emphasis added). For a critical look at that history see
infra-text accompanying notes 137-223.
37 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 87.
" Id. at 10-19.
39 All of the New England states except Connecticut permitted black suffrage in 1860. New
York allowed black men who owned $250 or more in property to vote. See L. LrFWACK, NORTH OF
SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE. STATES, 1790-1860 91 (1961) [hereinafter cited as NORTH OF
SLAVERY].
4U Id. at 67-68.
41 GOVERNMENT BY jIJOICIARY, supra note 8, at 1 1, 11.35a.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 52 - 68.
" Id.
as Id.
47 Id .
48 id .
" Id. at 123-24.
SO Id. at 157.
5 ' Id. at 157-65.
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to the supporters of the amendment and not its opponents to discern intent...• John A.
Bingham welcomed the amendment as a way of making the states respect the Bill of
Rights, but Berger cautions that Bingham's views were rejected by others in the Congress
and that Bingham's knowledge of the Constitution was hopelessly confused." Bingham
believed that the Bill of Rights was already binding on the states." If the plain language of
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment suggests the framers' support for black suffrage,"
Berger argues that the real motive was to insure Republican hegemony by reducing
Southern representation'"
That an amendment with such de minimis aims supplied the constitutional founda-
tion for the decision in Brown highlights, for Berger, how far the Court has strayed from
any consideration of the intent of the framers.'"Brown had a good result, Berger concedes
— it was, Berger borrows from Richard Kluger, "Simple Justice' — and Berger ac-
knowledges that any attempt to reverse the Court in the area of racial desegregation
would so rend the social fabric of American society as to make the political cure worse
than the constitutional disease.' Still, Berger argues, desirable results and social irrever-
sability do not constitute justification." Brown, however laudable, was usurpation, and if"
previous overextensions by the Court must be borne in the interests of societal cohesion,
present and future usurpations must be stopped by an aroused citizenry, properly jealous
of its democratic prerogatives.' Because Berger views the thwarting of the fourteenth
amendment's original intent as an ongoing process,• he concludes Government By judiciary
with a plea for a heightened public awareness of the jurisprudential legerdemain by
which the Court is reshaping the Constitution."' Berger argues that the Court's decisions
could not withstand such strict public scrutiny and that the Court, strictly observed, would
be forced to adhere more faithfully to the original meaning of constitutional provisions."
11 Berger acknowledges that both justice and perhaps irreversability have come about
because of the Court's activism in desegregation,"' he concedes neither point with regard
" Id. at 157.
" Id. at 143.
54 Id. For further discussion on this issue see infra note 215.
." Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment calls for a reduction in representation for those states
that deny the vote to male citizens on the basis of race. Section 2 provides:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
judicial officers of a Slate, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United Stales, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation .
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State,
U.S. Coxsr. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
56 GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 15-16; for a further discussion of this issue see
infra text accompanying notes 137-223.
57 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 243-45 and 286-88.
a R. KLUCER, SIMPLE ,JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited as SIMPLE JUSTICE].
59 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 412-13.
6° Id. at 413.
" Id. at 407-18.
fi2
° Id.
61 Id. at 415-18.
35
 See id. at 412-13.
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to the Court's decisions on capital punishment. Death Penalties attacks the Court even
more vigorously than Government By Judiciary." Berger regards the Court's capital pun-
ishment decisions as usurpation at its worst. 67 The Court has again usurped the province
of state legislatures, and if this critic is reading Berger's views correctly, the Court has
intruded into an area where the state legislatures have had the better view of the
problem. 68 In this study Berger advocates an explicit remedy: Congress should divest the
Court of jurisdiction, the ultimate, democratic antidote for an overactive court.t9
Berger's concern in Death Penalties is with two amendments, the eighth and the
fourteenth. His fourteenth amendment arguments are a reiteration of the arguments
made in Government By Judiciary, with an understandably more stringent focus on the
incorporation doctrine. 7° But Berger realizes that it is perhaps too late in the constitu-
tional day to rest a defense of the state's right to kill on an attack on the incorporation
doctrine. 7 ' So Death Penalties focuses on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment and how the Court has interpreted it. Unlike his discussion of the
fourteenth amendment, Berger's examination of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause does not offer a detailed picture of the debate surrounding the provision's adop-
tion. The sources are simply poorer. Like others, Berger constructs his argument con-
cerning the compatibility of' the death penalty and the eighth amendment by looking at
the world of crime and punishment that the framers of the eighth amendment inha-
bited." Death was a common punishment. The authors of the amendment also passed
legislation prescribing the death penalty for federal crimes." Corporal punishment was
equally common — brandings, whippings and mutilations were regular staples of
eighteenth century criminal justice!' In the words of eighth amendment opponent
Samuel Livermore, It is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve
whipping and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented
from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?""
And if eighteenth century American law and custom failed to place death or physical
punishment beyond the pale of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, preceding and
" DEATH PENALXIES, SUPra note 9, at 5-9.
61 Id.
68 In DEATH PENALTIES, Berger makes clear his view that the death penalty is not only constitu-
tionally permissible, but appropriate and desirable as a matter of policy. He shares his view that the
Supreme Court has been interfering in the executions of guilty murderers. DEATH PENALTIES, supra
note 9, at 6, 57. Berger also takes issue with the Court's decision in Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977), overturning Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for the murder of police officers:
As violence in the streets increasingly mounts, policemen who patrol crime-infested
areas take their lives in their hands; more and more policemen are killed in the line of
duty. Not unreasonably legislators have concluded that policemen require the utmost protection in
the shape of mandatory capital punishment for assailants.
DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, at 146 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 153-72.
7" Id. at 10-28.
While Berger critiques the incorporation doctrine, especially the doctrine of selective incor-
poration, see id., he also argues that the framers of the eighth amendment had no intention of
abolishing the death penalty and that efforts to curtail capital punishment through use of the eighth
amendment constitute a distortion of the framer's intentions. See id. at 29-58. Berger also makes the
case for capital punishment on policy grounds. See id. at 176-78.
72 Id. at 47-50.
id. at 47.
" Id. at 39.
n Id, at 45-46.
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contemporary English practice provides an even grimmer picture for opponents of
capital punishment.'" Berger correctly details the horrors of English capital jurispru-
dence." The death penalty was imposed for trivial offenses.'" Children were hanged for
petty theft. Disembowelment while alive was the English punishment for treason despite,
and Berger makes much of this fact, the prohibition against cruel and illegal punishments
in the English Bill of Rights.'" Class discrimination was rampant in the exercise of the
British death penalty."' Those sentenced to death with "benefit of clergy" could have their
sentences commuted if they could read the Bible.' In effect this provision insured that
the illiterate poor would be executed while those who were better off would escape the
extreme penalty." Little in the harsh world that was eighteenth century criminal justice
suggested that the death penalty, or its disproportionate or discriminatory application was
beyond the pale of what was then deemed cruel and unusual.
Berger is reluctantly aware, however, that an attack on the Supreme Court's interven-
tion in death penalty cases cannot rest solely on a foundation of eighteenth century
sensibilities. The fourteenth amendment raises serious questions about discriminatory
application of the death penalty. The doctrine of society's evolving standards of decency,
a doctrine Berger argues is better expressed through legislative instead of judicial action,
has become a firm part of eighth amendment jurisprudence." Berger realizes these views
must be answered if Death Penalties is to make its case.
For Berger, the fourteenth amendment problem is easily solved. Its framers had no
intention of abolishing the death penalty or indeed interfering with the states' administra-
tion of criminal justice." Their sole purpose was guaranteeing a certain minimum of
rights to the freedmen.• The scope of the Court's fourteenth amendment concerns
regarding a state's activities concerning crime and punishment should be properly
confined to an examination of whether or not state statutes are discriminatory on their
face." Echoing Thaddeus Stevens's statement, "Whatever law punishes a white man for a
crime shall punish the black man precisely the same way;" Berger offers a limited view of
the equal protection clause."' For Berger, that clause is not. a license for judicial inquiries
into discriminatory sentencing patterns, differential exercises of prosecutorial discretion,
and disparities in jury sentencing." According to Berger, "nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to ... save an undoubtedly guilty black murderer from the
death penalty because a jury had sentenced a white to life imprisonment. . . , "69 If the
statute is facially neutral, Berger believes the Constitution is satisfied."
" For two examinations of capital punishment in eighteenth century England, see D. HAY, P.
LINF.BAHMI, j. RULE, E..P. TnomPSON, AND C. WINSLOW, ALB/ON'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1975); Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedures at Common Law, in J.S.
COCKBURN, CRIME Is ENGLAND, 1550-1880 (1977).
77 DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, at 30-43.
" Id. at 40.
78 Id. at 39-41.
" See id. at 42.
t" Id. at 42.
" Id.
83 Id. at 48-49.
" Id. at 56-57.
" Id.
85 Id .
" Id. at 55.
" Id. at 54-58.
" Id. at 57.
90 Id.
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Adaptation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to take into account evolving
standards of decency is, Berger argues, "judicial midwifery."' Bound by the original
intent that gave rise to the clause, the Court should defer to legislative bodies to make
clear what new public sentiment has developed with respect to punishment of criminals."'
The public knows when a penalty is incompatible with changed public sentiment and the
public, through the legislative mechanism, is properly empowered to alter or abolish
punishments?' Berger puts it starkly: "At issue is not whether a man may be hanged for
stealing a loaf of bread, but whether the Court is authorized to take that decision away
front the legislature and the people.'
Besides, Berger argues, the Court has severely misread public sentiment on the death
penalty. 95 Capital punishment has popular support?" The legislatures of a majority of
states have redrafted capital statutes to overcome the restrictions imposed by the Court in
Furman v. Georgia." And Berger views this public response as a reasonable effort to
protect society from its more unreasonable members, and from the decisions of the Court
whose pronouncements, in Berger's view, have far exceeded its constitutional mandate." 8
II. AN UNEASY SYNCRETISM: THE CoNsTrru ox AND THE COMMON LAW
Berger presents an ancient complaint. Fear that a too powerful judiciary, armed with
the supremacy clause, would have an unlimited license to interfere with state law was a
major concern of those anti-federalists who objected to the new Constitution." Even
before the Constitution's enactment, the courts of the new independent states had
demonstrated that judges, armed with a fundamental charter, a state constitution, could
and would declare acts of popularly elected legislatures void, in conflict with the state's
fundamental law.'" That one of the prime supporters of the new federal Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton, explained that the proposed judicial power outlined in article 1I1
would be used in such a manner, could not have lessened the fears of the Constitution's
opponents.'"' The ratification debate, carried out in eighteenth century America's vigor-
ous pamphlet press, presaged future constitutional controversy. 101 These late eighteenth
century debates are central to the questions Berger examines. They can furnish us with a
clue to the original understanding of the Constitution not only in terms of the allocation
of power but, more importantly, a sense of the processes the Constitution's protagonists
believed would be employed by the Court in interpreting the new Constitution.
9 ' Id. at 60.
" Id. at 8.
93 Id.
" 4 Id. at 128.
95
 See id. at 125-26.
96 Id.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
96
 See generally DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9.
99 See THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (C.M. Kenyon, ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as THE AN-
TI- FEDERALISTS].
' a° L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN]. One
such case was the famous Quock Walker decision in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts declared, in 1783, that slavery was contrary to the Massachusetts Constitution. Commonwealth
v. Jennison, PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc., 1873-1875, 293 (April 1783). For a good discussion of this case
see A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE
COLONIAL. PERIOD 91-98 (1978).
101 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
'°2 See THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 99; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80(A. Hamilton).
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Berger's view of an original constitutional intent designed to limit strictly the powers
of the Court correctly states the arguments but misstates the concerns of the Federalist
framers. Berger correctly details the framers' concerns with limited government, a limited
government that would adhere strictly to its delegated powers. 103
 But Berger's discussion
fails to present the focus of the framers' concerns. Their concern was with the legislature,
the possibility that it, like the British Parliament and Crown they had so recently rebelled
against, would overstep its bounds and through its ability to pass laws become oppressive.
From the beginning, the Court was seen as a frankly anti-majoritarian check on potential
excesses of popular passion.'"
Both the eighteenth century supporters and opponents of the Constitution acknowl-
edged that the judicial activism Berger so assiduously denounces would be inherent in the
powers granted to the Court. Constitutional opponent. Robert Yates, writing under the
name "Brutus," argued that article 111 gave unspecified powers to the judiciary, powers
that perforce judges would employ to fill in gaps, to give meaning, where the law was
ambiguous.'" Because, in Yates's view, the Constitution authorized judges to employ then
recognized principles of statutory construction in interpreting the demands of the Con-
stitution and other laws, judges would have a measure of latitude, some ability to inject
their views into the nation's fundamental law.'" Even more disturbing from Yates's point
of view was the power permitting the Court to make determinations concerning equity as
well as law.'" Yates saw equity jurisdiction as conferring on the Court an open-ended
commission, permitting constructions according to the spirit of the law, constructions
that, Yates argued. would inevitably be destructive of state sovereignty.'"
If Berger is consistent with caveats vigorously stressed in both books, he would
caution dismissal of Yates's objection as the arguments of an opponent and therefore
hardly a guide to the intentions of those who proposed article III.'" It is not that simple.
While the views of those who object to proposed laws cannot supply dispositive proof of
legislative intent, they are nonetheless valuable sources, important to an analysis of a law's
meaning. The views of critics of proposed legislation supply an important reminder of the
intensely political process that lawmaking is. Compromises in language, assurances in
meaning, are more often than not traceable to attempts to answer charges raised by
critics. Critics are also often a major source of historical hints concerning the hidden
agendas, the unspoken assumptions that motivated the supporters of legislation. Most
importantly, the objections of critics are important because they can furnish evidence of
what the language of a constitutional or statutory provision meant to those considering it.
In this area Yates's objections are most valuable. Yates had a sense of the judicial process.
His objections were those of a man who realized that even under the relatively conserva-
tive common-law processes then employed, judges exercised lawmaking powers. Written
laws, particularly ones like the broadly worded new Constitution, left room for judicial
discretion, for adapting law to different cases, and ultimately, changing circumstances."°
"" See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80 (A. Hamilton).
" THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80 (A. Hamilton).
ANrirEnERALisrs, supra note 99, at 334.
106 Id. at 334-37.
1" Id.
108
10"
	 By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, passim ; DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, passim .
n° THE ANTIEEDERALISTS, supra note 99, at 334-37.
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This idea that part of the original understanding of the Constitution included an
ability to exercise common-law reasoning processes within the framework of the Constitu-
tion need not rest solely on an analysis of the objections raised by Yates and other
opponents. The writings of constitutional advocate Alexander Hamilton also supply
evidence, albeit more ambiguously, that the judiciary proposed in article III would
operate in ways familiar to eighteenth century students of the common-law processes.
Hamilton, in The Federalist, was attempting to persuade opponents and the public at large
of the desirability of the new Constitution and that, among other things, the proposed
judicial branch would not constitute a threat. to the liberties of the people of the new
republic."' His assurances took two directions. Hamilton pointed to the Court's relative
lack of power, its possession of "neither the sword nor the purse," as the best check against
potential excess on the Court's part.' Hamilton also expressed the view that the Court
should be bound to adhere strictly to the law without substituting the private predilictions
of justices for the demands of the law." 3
Hamilton's assurances that the Court would be strictly constrained must be balanced
against his reasons for preferring and zealously advocating a strong, independent
judiciary. He frankly expressed the view that the reasoning, what he termed the artificial
reasoning, of judges, was superior to the kinds of thinking that informed legislative
bodies.'" Judges, Hamilton emphasized, benefited from extensive, laborious training in
the law." 3 Their reasoning should not be hampered by control from their intellectual
inferiors, the kind of men who inhabited legislatures."'" Hamilton's view of limited
government was expressly a government with the power to limit the legislative excess that
Hamilton feared."' If Hamilton's writings indicate anything, they indicate a faith that
extensive training in the common law and study of the laws of other nations, coupled with
artificial reasoning, an ability to craft law to the demands of cases, would provide a
necessary check on legislative excess."' Hamilton conceded that "individual oppression
may now and then proceed from the court," that judges could stray from their man-
date. 19 But Hamilton's view was that the Court's relative lack of power held its potential
excesses in check.' 2°
Hamilton's view, then, was of a Court capable of construing the Constitution and
other laws using the tools that common-law judges had traditionally employed. Like
Yates, Hamilton viewed the Constitution as authorizing the Court to use familiar tools of
judicial reasoning to decide cases and ultimately to advance law.''' In light of Hamilton's
faith in the judicial reasoning process, some of his statements concerning the inevitability
of strict construction of statutory provisions must be viewed as a somewhat disingenuous
attempt on Hamilton's part to make the case for the Court's powers to a public already
suspicious of the role of lawyers and courts in American society.'"
'" See THE FEDERALISTS Nos. 78, 79, 80 (A. Hamilton).
112 THE FEDERALISTS No. 78, at 483 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
" 3 Id. at 487.
m THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 503-04 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
115 Id.
'a id,
"7 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
" 8 Id.
1 " Id.
'" Id.
'' Id.
' 22 For a discussion of anti-lawyer sentiment in colonial America see FRIEDMAN, supra note 100,
at 82-84.
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If there were early indications that the judicial power included an ability to fashion
constitutional provisions to meet the peculiar demands of cases and, by implication,
changing circumstances, the actions of the earliest Federalist judges provided further
evidence that at least that political persuasion regarded article III as a flexible commis-
sion. In Marbury v. Madison'" and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,'" Federalist Chief Justice
Marshall moved to make firm the framers' concept of judicial review with respect to both
federal and state enactments.'" In McCulloch v. Maryland, 12' Marshall set forth a doctrine
of implied powers, conceding that no such doctrine was set forth in the Constitution but
also arguing that there was no prohibition of such powers as there had been in the Articles
of Confederation."' In the face of strong Republican''" opposition, Marshall adhered to a
flexible view of the Constitution and the Court's interpretive authority, a view annun-
ciated in McCulloch where Marshall distinguished between following the prolixities of a
civil code and expounding a constitution. 19
That view grew stronger in nineteenth century America. Justice Story turned his
reading of the law of nations and the commercial needs of antebellum America into a
constitutional license to fashion a federal common taw of negotiable instruments in Swift
v. Tyson.' Chief justice Taney in his opinion in Dred Scott reasoned that free blacks were
not citizens of the United States although nothing in the constitutional language sug-
gested this conclusion."' In antebellum America a policy oriented instrumental style of
common-law reasoning had developed. 132
 Frankly result oriented, the American judiciary
took written laws, as well as common-law precedents, as points of departure from which to
weigh desired policies against legal guidelines.'" If any original doubts existed that the
Constitution authorized the Court to fill in the interstices of constitutional provisions, the
conduct of the American judiciary made it clear that the courts Felt they COU Id not exercise
their legal mandates without such power. For better or, or perhaps and, worse the
American constitutional system had become, in the years before the Civil War, a hybrid,
an uneasy amalgam of written statutes or constitutional provisions, interpreted by judges
who held on to a common-law reasoning process, a process that permitted judges to
develop law.'"
Berger claims that this history of antebellum instrumentalism is confined to state
court actions concerning private law.' 35
 That view is not sustained by the evidence.
' 23 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'' 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
'n See supra notes 123 and 124.
126
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
" Id. at 404.
129 The term Republican here is used for the Democratic-Republican party, the party of Thomas
Jefferson and the ancestor of the modern Democratic party. Subsequent use of the term in this
article will refer to the modern Republican party.
` 19
 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 357.
` 30
 41 U.S. (19 Pet.) 1 (1842). For an article praising Story's instrumental reading of the
Constitution, see Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and 'The' True National Common Law,
18 Am. U.L. REV. 316 (1969).
` 31 See supra note 28 and infra note 182.
13 ' Horowitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, 5 PERSPEC-
TIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287 (1971).
"3 Id.
134 EQUAL, JusTicz UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 71-73, 347-49.
`as GOVERNMENT By JuniciAuy, supra note 8, at 306-10.
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Neither Story's opinion in Swift, nor Taney's in Dred Scott are explainable solely as the
reasoning of men shackled by strict constructions of the Constitution. Their decisions
were made with a view towards, where there was arguable constitutional leeway, enshrin-
ing their conceptions of the public good into constitutional law. This observation is
important not because of the findings and results in those and other antebellum constitu-
tional cases. What is critical here is that the merger of constitutional guideline and
common-law methodology was already, in antebellum America, familiar to students of the
Court's behavior. That the Court would take the Constitution as a broad outline against
which the Court would fashion constitutional doctrine was already a part of the intellec-
tual and legal heritage of those who framed the fourteenth amendment,'" Their inten-
tions cannot be properly assessed without such a realization.
III. RECAPTURING THE UNALIENABLE: THE EGALITARIAN ROAD TO THE FOURTEENTH
A MEN OM E:Nrr -
Still, a realization by the framers of the fourteenth amendment. that time, circum-
stance and the Court would add new dimensions to the law they drafted would scarcely
justify the Court's thwarting of their fundamental intentions. If Berger's understanding
of the fourteenth amendment's history is essentially correct, serious questions follow
concerning the Court's common-law processes and its ability to use such processes to do
violence to original understandings. This question is fundamentally historical. And al-
though it is in this area that Berger stakes his strongest claim, it is also here that his
weaknesses are most serious. Berger's view of the history of the fourteenth amendment
suffers from an overly narrow focus that weakensboth his and his reader's understanding
of the motives that brought about the fourteenth amendment's adoption. Myopia, unfor-
tunately, is not Berger's sole deficiency as an historian. Government By Judiciary contains
crucial sins of omission, the ignoring of evidence damaging to Berger's thesis."
Few men in American history, perhaps indeed the history of any nation, have made
greater contributions to human rights and have been treated less generously by their
nation's historians than those Republican politicians who, between the years of 1861 and
1876, abolished slavery and set the nation on the as yet unfinished path towards nonracial
democracy. Their idealism has been forgotten, their faults magnified.' 3 ' The frequent
coincidence of self-interest and egalitarian legislation has served as a basis for discounting
genuine Republican anti-slavery and egalitarian sentiment.'" A generation of historians
who dominated the discussion on Reconstruction earlier in this century managed success-
fully to impart to the nation their view of the Radical Republicans as a cynical group
imposing a needlessly harsh and vindictive Reconstruction on the South to establish and
maintain their dominance in national politics."' This vision is still prevalent."' To that
EQUAL jusTicE UNDER Lsw,supra note 31, at. 71-73, 347-49. Hyman and Wiecek contend that
many Republicans initially believed that the thirteenth amendment alone would be broad enough to
permit the federal government to make far reaching inquiries into the liberties of Americans. Id. at
390 - 92. See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAM'. L. Rev. 1
(1955).
' 37 See infra notes 182-201 and accompanying text for a discussion on suffrage.
138 See infra notes 140-43.
1:39
1" This characterization was the view of the "Dunning School" of Reconstruction historio-
graphy. For some examples, see W.A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC (1906);
C.G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA (1929) and W.L. FLEMING, CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN
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earlier vision a more recent one has been added, a modern disenchantment with that
quintessential American icon, Abraham Lincoln."' Lincoln's very real racism has served
to obscure, on the part of both popular and scholarly writers his genuine anti-slavery
idealism and his cautious growth towards a qualified egalitarianism by the end of his
life.'" Government By Judiciary suffers from a too uncritical acceptance of the harsher views
American historians have expressed concerning the Republicans of the Civil War and
Reconstruction era,' with an inadequate investigation and presentation of both their
nobler sentiments and very real achievements. An appreciation of these latter qualities is
critical to any understanding of the legal legacy they have left us.
A significant failure in Berger's discussion of the fourteenth amendment lies in his
treatment of northern racism. It is treated as a consistent phenomenon, largely unaf-
fected either by the passage of time or the sharpening of sectional rivalries.' Berger's is
in .large part a conceptual failure, an unwillingness to explore the subtle and delicate
intermixtures of idealism and self-interest that brought about at least a temporary trans-
formation in northern views Concerning race. Sectional conflict caused a reassessment of
the question of race on the part of many northerners." That reassessment was occurring
even before the Civil War, aided by what many in the North saw as an unseemly southern
vigor in defense of the South's Peculiar Institution. If abolitionists were vilified and
physically attacked as extremists in the 1830's, the Fugitive Slave Act and the Dred Scott
decision in the 1850's helped anti-slavery advocates gain new, more sympathetic audi-
ences."' The Civil War caused even more profound changes.'" Neither Billy Yank nor
Ins political supporters marched to war in 1861 with abolitionist aims, but his experience
in the nation's most bloody conflict caused the North to see the South in a harsher light.""
Berger argues for a dichotomy between northern desires to dominate or at least control
the South and a genuine sympathy on the part of northern politicians fbr blacks.'" Such a
choice is riot necessary for our understanding of the fourteenth amendment or other laws
of the Reconstruction era. Instead, as one of Berger's more perceptive critics has noted,
the two may be closely related. The Civil \\Tar
 served to increase northern hatred for the
South; it also created a new concern for the rights of blacks.'"
ALABAMA (1905). From Berger's language it appears he essentially accepts this view of the Radical
Republicans. He writes of "extremist efforts to put through legislation or amendments that would
confer stiffrage." - GovERNNtr.NT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 7. Massachusetts Republican Charles
Sumner is described as "destined to become a spokesman for extreme abolitionist views." Id. at 10- 11.
In GOVERNMENT By ]UDICIARY, supra note 8, at 50, Berger mentions, "Southern whites fighting
misrule and military government."
"' See generally Stampp, The Tragic Legend of Recomiruction, in RECONSTRUCTION: AN ANTHOLOGY
of RevrsioxisT Wkrrises (K.M. Stampp and L.F. Litwack, eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Stampp].
"2 Simpt.k, JusrrcE, supra note 58, at 41-43,
15 EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 278.
See supra notes 140-93 and accompanying text.
15 See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10- 16. In this discussion Berger reviews the
history of northern racism prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment without considering
the changes in northern racial attitudes brought about by sharpening sectional conflict.
F'S See infra note 147.
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 191-202; Soifer, supra note 31, at 668.
146 id .
' 4 ' See infra note 151.
' 50
 GovntxmENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 14 - 16.
'' Soifer, supra note 31, at 687.
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Perhaps nowhere is this relationship more evident than in the transformation of
Lincoln's views. Lincoln entered the White House a firm believer in white supremacy,
despite his genuine abhorrence of slavery.'" He changed. The demands of war trans-
formed Lincoln into an emancipationist. The performance of nearly 200,000 black troops
serving with Union forces caused Lincoln, like others, to alter his thinking Nrther. 153 By
the middle of the war, he routinely discussed the question of race with black abolitionist
Frederick Douglass.'" The turnabout was not immediate. He waited for the propitious
political and military moment to issue his Emancipation Proclamation.'" His administra-
tion waited until well into the war before deciding to pay black troops the same wage as
white troops.'" In 1862, Lincoln informed a black audience that colonization represented
the optimal solution to the American racial dilemma.' But the turnabout occurred. By
the end of his career, he had come to the conclusion that colonization was impossible.'
Before his assassination, he had begun to advocate a limited black franchise, a right to
vote confined to literate black men who had served with Union forces.''" His growth
presaged the direction his party would take after the war.'"
Even during the conflict, profound changes were occurring in the federal govern-
ment's racial posture. The first Republican administration acted to nullify Tansy's opin-
ion that free blacks were not citizens of the United States.' 61 Attorney General Edward
Bates issued opinions indicating that free blacks were citizens of the United States and
thus entitled to licenses as ship's masters and military commissions.' Bates also wrote an
opinion indicating that, because free blacks were citizens at the beginning of the conflict,
those who enlisted in the Union Army were entitled to the same pay and bounties as white
soldiers."' Even the limited commissioning of black officers in the Union forces rep-
152 EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 169, 196-97.
1" See generally Stamp!), supra note 141.
154 Soifer, supra note 31, at 687.
J.M. McPuERsoN, Tim NEGRO'S CIVIL ‘VAR: HOW AMERICAN NEGROES FELT AND ACTED
DURING THE WAR FOR THE UNION 48-49 (1965) [hereinafter cited as THE NEGRO'S Oyu. WAR].
Id. at 193-203.
1 " Id. at 89-92. Colonization had long been an option favored by opponents of slavery who were
also hostile to the presence of a large free black population in the United States. In essence,
colonization was an expatriation scheme designed to settle free blacks outside of the United States.
The American Colonization Society was the largest and most successful colonization organization.
Founded in 1817, it sponsored the Afro-American colonization of Liberia. Its efforts were opposed
by northern free black organizations and by such white abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison. The
basis of free black and abolitionist opposition to colonization was basic and simple. Blacks and
abolitionists were concerned 1101 only with the anti-slavery struggle but also with the struggle for
equal rights for free blacks. Their contention that blacks were Americans, entitled to equal rights in
American society clashed sharply with the view of most colonizationists that black freedom required
black expatriation.
Early in his administration, Lincoln advocated free black 'colonization of Central and South
America. Lincoln was able to convince a small group of free blacks to attempt to establish colonies in
Panama and the Caribbean. These colonies proved to be unsuccessful and towards the end of his
administration, Lincoln had the colonists returned to the United States. See FROM SLAVERY To
FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 176-79, 213.
150 THE NEGRO'S CIVIL WAR, supra note 155, at 96-97.
1" See EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 278.
1" Id.
761 See sup;-a note 29.
162
"3 Id.
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resented a significant break with previous policies, an acknowledgment of citizenship that
would have been too radical to contemplate in the decades immediately preceding the
war.'" Sectional conflict had brought profound change in northern views.
The attitudes of the Thirty-ninth Congress that passed the fourteenth amendment
were shaped by the war experience. The peace of Appomattox had left them with a nation
and particularly a region to rebuild, Even the most conservative were convinced that the
abolition of the institution that had brought on the war, slavery, was a prerequisite to the
security of the reformed union.' The war time Emancipation Proclamation' was
"1 Approximately 100 black men, not counting chaplains, were commissioned during the Civil
War. See THE NEnizo's CIVIL WAR, supra note 155, at 238-39.
I"' For a valuable examination of the increased support gained for the abolitionist cause during
the Civil War, see l.M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 99-133 (1964).
1 " The Emancipation Proclamation, issued by Lincoln on September 22, 1862, took effect on
January 1, 1863. Using his authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Lincoln
proclaimed freedom for those slaves in rebellious southern states. The proclamation did not free
slaves held in Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, West Virginia and Missouri all of which remained
Unionist despite their slave-state status. See B. BAILYN, D.B. DAVIS, D. DONALD, J. THOMAS, R. WIEBE,
G. WOOD, THE GREAT REPUBLIC; A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 660 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as THE GREAT REPUBLIC]. The text of the Emancipation Proclamation follows:
January 1, 1863
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of
the United States, containing, among other things, the following to wit:
That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State,
the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall he then,
thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States,
including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of
them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.
That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation,
designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, shall on that
day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members
chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall
have participated, shall in the absence of strung countervailing testimony, be deemed
conclusive evidence that such State. and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion
against the United States.
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the
power in me invested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United
States in time of actual rebellion against authority and government of the United States,
and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first
day of January, in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and sixty - three,
and in accordance with my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of
one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the
States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this clay in
rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:
Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jeffer-
son, St. Johns, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche,
St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans), Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the
forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkely,
Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including
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extended and formalized by the thirteenth amendment.'" It proved insufficient.
Through legal subterfuge, the black cocks, southern state governments quickly moved to
preserve as much of the antebellum social order as could survive national law and
northern victory.'" Lincoln's successor Andrew Johnson, a man with strong anti-black
sentiments, made no objection to the South's virtual reintroduction of slavery. Concerned
members of the Thirty-ninth Congress realized more was needed.' 69
Aware that the South, if left to its own devices, would turn the abolition of slavery
into a hollow mockery, the Thirty-ninth Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It
was a law at once profoundly radical, yet deeply conservative, the product of political
compromise between those committed to full equality for the freedmen and those who
argued that the abolition of slavery was sufficient, that further measures would interfere
with the rights of the states.'" The Act produced a new, national definition of citizenship
covering everyone born in the United States, except Indians subject to tribal authority."'
It specified that the freedmen could not be denied access to state courts, that they had a
right to appear as witnesses and to bring suits as plaintiffs, that the old state limitations on
the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth; and which excepted parts are, for the present,
left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued).
And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare
that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and
henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States,
including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of said persons.
And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all
violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases
when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.
And 1 further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition, will
be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions,
stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.
And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the
Constitution, upon military , necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind,
and the gracious favor of Almighty God.
In witness whereof, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United
States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United
States of America the eighty-seventh.
By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN
William H. Seward, Secretary of State.
167 The thirteenth amendment was proposed by the thirty-eighth Congress on January 31, 1865,
while the Civil War was still in progress. It was ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the
thirty-six states on December 18, 1865. The amendment brought an end to all slavery in the United
States and territories subject to United States jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The thirteenth
amendment provides as follows:
Section I. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,.or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
188 EQUAL. JUSTIC.E LINDER LAW, supra note 31, at 319-22.
'"' THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DERATES, 39TH CONG. (1865-1866) 121-29, 131-34,
136-41, 161-71, 174-83, 186-2I0 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES); H. WILSON, HISTORY OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES OF THE 39TH AND 40TH CONGRESSES 118-47, passim (1970) [hereinafter
cited as RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES'.
I" 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
' 71 Id.
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such rights were void.'" Also forbidden were state statutes that prescribed different
criminal penalties for blacks and whites." 3 Aware that a change in the letter of the law
could easily he thwarted by state courts beholden to state interests, the framers of the
statute included a provision allowing blacks and white Unionists to remove their cases to
federal district courts.'"
Champions of equal rights were painfully aware of the Civil Rights Acts's limitations.
The law specified in detail the rights bestowed: the right to own and dispose of property,
the right to make contracts, the right to testify in court. It was a catalogue of minimal
rights long denied blacks in most states.' 75 The measure nonetheless represented a radical
break with the past. IL provided a basis for federal inquiry into a state's legal treatment of
its citizens, a fact of which opponents of the measure were painfully and vocally aware.
Over democratic opposition and Andrew Johnson's veto the Civil Rights Act became
law.'"
Its supporters realized the measure's inadequacies.'" Opponents of the law chal-
lenged its constitutionality, both with regard to its definition of citizenship and its enum-
eration of the citizen's rights.' 78 Realizing that the statute alone stood little long-range
chance of survival in the face of a hostile president and the probable readmission of
southern congressional delegations on terms favorable to the South, supporters of equal
rights pressed for the fourteenth amendment as a means of both legitimizing the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and extending further protection to blacks and others.' 79
Berger's contention that the minimal guarantees of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
reflected the limited egalitarian agenda of the Thirty-ninth Congress is at sharp variance
with the historical record. Government By judiciary, properly focuses our attention on the
suffrage issue as an important indicator of that Congress' views on the brbader question
of black equality.'" Suffrage had long been a focus of concern on the part of free blacks
and white advocates of equal rights.'"' Both groups were painfully aware that free blacks
had enjoyed and exercised the right to vote in most states when the Constitution was
drafted, that white only voting requirements were creatures of nineteenth century law.'"
'"
in Id .
174
 Id.
175
 For a good general survey of the legal and social disabilities that even free southern blacks
Suffered in the antebellum years see: I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1976).
176 RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, supra note 169, at 145-47.
' 77 DEBATES, SUpra note 169, at 121-29, 131-34, 136-41, 161-71, 174-83, 186-210; RECONSTRUC-
TION MEASURES, .CUPM note 169, at 118-47.
DEBATES, SUpra note 169, at 121-29, 131-34, 136.41, 161-71, 174-83, 186-210; RECONSTRUC-
TION MEASURES, supra note 169, at. 118-47,
1" DEBATES, supra note 169, at 149-61,
i " GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 52-68.
NORTH or SLAVERY, supra note 39, at 75-79.
LOS Illinois Republican Representative Richard Yates made this point in house debate on Feb-
ruary 19, 1866. He noted that free blacks were citizens when the Constitution was adopted and were
entitled to vote in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina. The
list is actually somewhat more extensive. See infra this footnote. See also EQUAL JusricE UNDER LAW,
supra note 31, at 190-92; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
One of the problems with Berger's view that the original Constitution was racist is that it ignores
the legal status of free blacks during the late eighteenth century generally and in the Constitution
specifically. While the Constitution did have measures protectitt slavery. see U.S. CONS,'. art. 1, § 9
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The denial of the vote in the antebellum years had been for blacks and many of their
white well-wishers one of the more visible symbols of the denial of black citizenship.'" For
many, suffrage provided the critical distinction between the citizen and the noncitizen.
They knew what was at stake. The right to vote was necessary to protect other rights.
Black enfranchisement would provide insurance that state governments would deal fairly
with blacks.'" For Republicans black enfranchisement in the South would also insure that
southern politicians would be forced to be responsive to one group of proven Unionists.'"
Republicans were also well aware that they would be the likely beneficiaries of the
extension of suffrage to blacks.' Republicans were not. slow to come to this realization, as
Berger contends;'"' they knew blacks had little reason to support the largely racist
Democratic party.'" Also Republican politicians could not have been unaware that their
party received the support of black voters in those northeastern states where black
suffrage was permitted.'"
The Thirty-ninth Congress acted to promote black suffrage. By the end of 1866 that
Congress passed a bill granting suffrage to black men in the District of Columbia.'" The
bill became law when it survived Andrew Johnson's veto by a vote of 29 to 10 in the Senate
and 113 to 38 in the House.'" Similar legislation was passed, again over Johnson's veto,
granting the right of black men to vote in the territories,' The territorial legislation
survived Johnson's veto by a vote of 24 to 7 in the Senate and 104 to 38 in the House.'"
In his discussion of the suffrage issue, Berger emphasizes the Thirty-ninth Congress'
readmission of the Tennessee congressional delegation, despite that state's restriction of
the ballot to while men, as proof of that Congress' lack of support for black suffrage. 184
That discussion is incomplete. Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, a strong proponent
of black suffrage, reported in his remembrances of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Con-
and art. IV, § 2, the Constitution had no provisions that barred free blacks from the exercise of full
citizenship. Free blacks were counted as full persons for purposes of Congressional representation.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. Nowhere in the Constitution is race made a criterion for voting or holding
office. In the 'ate eighteenth century, free blacks were eligible to vote in a majority of states, including
all of New England, New York, New jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina and
Tennessee. These rights were lost in most states in the nineteenth century except for the ones
mentioned supra note 38. See Diamond and Cottrol, Codifying Caste, Louisiana's Racial Classification
Statute and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy, L. REV, 255, 260-61 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Codifying
Caste).
'" For one example where disfranchisement was reversed, see R. Corrxot., 'THE AFRO-
YANKEES: PROVIDENCE'S BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE ANTEBELLUM E.RA 67-112 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as THE AFRO-YANKEES].
Si1 12EcoNsmucrioN MEASURES, supra note 169, at 36-40, 55-56, 62-63, 239-40.
1 " See infra note 189.
'" Id.
187 GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, SUpra note 8, at 15- 16, 30 - 31, 57.
1 " Id.
1 " Throughout the nineteenth century, black voters had a history of voting against the Demo-
cratic Party. This history considerably antedated the Civil War and was, in those Northeastern states
where blacks were permitted to vote, well known to politicians of all parties. It was one of the reasons
for the hostility of the Democratic Party towards blacks. See Fox, The Negro Vote in Old New York, 32
PoL. Sci. Q. 253 (1917); THE AFRO-YANKEES, supra note 183. at 67-112.
19° RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, Supra note 169, at 266-97; 14 Stat. 375 (1866).
191 RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, supra note 169, at 266-97; 14 Stat. 375 (1866).
'92 RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, supra note 169, at 298-302; 14 Stat.. 379 (1866).
1 " RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, supra note 169, at. 298-302; 14 Stat. 379 (1866).
191 GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 79-80, 95, 105.
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gresses that a deal had been struck with the Tennessee delegation. 195 Tennessee was to be
readmitted upon ratification of the fourteenth amendment and a pledge that that state's
legislature would pass legislation permitting black suffrage.'" The Tennessee legislature
honored that pledge.'"
The suffrage issue is critical not only for its intrinsic importance, but because it is
indicative of the success that the radicals had throughout the year 1866 in winning
support. to the cause of equal rights. It should be remembered that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was passed in the early part of that year. 198 Towards the end of the year, Radical
Republicans, aided by increasing dissatisfaction with Andrew Johnson, fears of a con-
tinued spirit of rebellion in the South, and reminders of black loyalty during the Civil
War, had a more receptive audience for egalitarian legislation in the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress.'" The debates over the fourteenth amendment should be examined in that light.
Those debates, far from sustaining Berger's view of the fourteenth amendment as an
attempt to extend a highly limited degree of protection to the freedmen, reveal a strong
desire on the part of the provision's advocates to advance the cause of equal rights. ' 00
Again this characterization is well-illustrated in the suffrage issue. Unlike the Civil Rights
Act, the fourteenth amendment provided clear support for black suffrage. Berger's
reading of section 2 as simply an attempt to deprive the South of representation is at odds
with the statements of that section's supporters expressing the view that., although the
South might initially elect decreased representation, the southern states would ultimately
choose black enfranchisement over a loss of congressional seats."'
In other ways the framers of the amendment demonstrated a significant break with
past and contemporary prejudices. The language of the amendment alone was enough to
cause alarm. As if the prospect of making blacks citizens entitled to equal rights with
whites failed to generate enough opposition, the implications of the plain meaning of the
amendment excited other prejudices."' A representative from California sought the
exclusion of Chinese from the definition of citizenship.'" Several western representatives
See infra note 197.
198 Id.
,P7
	 MEASURES, supra note 169, at 303-13; Alexander, Political Reconstruction in
Tennessee, 1865-1870, 56-63, cited in RADicartsm, RACISM AND PARTS REALIGNMENT (Curry, ed. 1969).
' 9" The Civil Rights Act of 1866 became law in April, 1866. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
The District of Columbia suffrage bill was passed in December, 1866 and survived Johnson's
veto in January, 1867. 14 Stat. 375 (1867). The territorial suffrage bill was enacted in January, 1867.
14 Stat. 379 (1867).
"' See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
'See DEBATES, supra note 169, at 212 (Speech of Thaddeus Stevens, May 8, 1866).
".2
 Section 1 of the proposed amendment, declaring all persons born in the United States to be
citizens, dismayed those with prejudices against numerous groups, including, of course, those with
strong anti-black sentiments. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. The text of section 1 is as
follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enfbrce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI V.
2" DEBATES, Mira BOW 169, at 152, 224.
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demanded that Indians ; taxed or untaxed, remain outside of the American nation. 20' A
Congressman from Pennsylvania delivered a tirade against Gypsies declaring that they
should not be made citizens.'"' Despite the risk of adding new opponents to the proposed
amendment, the advocates of universal citizenship held firm. Regional bigotries would
not be given effect in this alteration of the nation's fundamental charter.
This forthright championship of both universal citizenship and universal manhood
suffrage by the supporters of the fourteenth amendment furnishes strong evidence that
the amendment's framers possessed ideals and concerns broader than those Berger has
attributed to them. Despite their understandable focus on the question of the South and
the problem of the freedman, they had also embraced an ideal of human equality, an
ideal they vigorously defended in Congressional debate and an ideal they successfully
wrote into the nation's fundamental law.
It is essentially impossible to appreciate the intentions of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment without understanding that amendment as, in part, the intellectual
product of the anti-slavery movement, a movement forced, against the prevailing beliefs
of its day, to embrace both an egalitarian view of the human species and a firm belief in
natural law.'UH With antebellum America's positive law squarely arrayed on the side of
slavery and slaveholders, anti-slavery thinkers had become vigorous proponents of theo-
ries of natural law.' 07 As the jusitilication for slavery in nineteenth century America rested
largely on presumptions of black inferiority, anti-slavery advocates increasingly became
converts to the idea of human equality. 208 Little in the antebellum intellectual or legal
milieu supported their views.
But if their nineteenth century present offered little support for either anti-slavery or
egalitarian ideals, anti-slavery thinkers realized that the natural law premises of the
Declaration of Independence supported their reasoning.'" This realization furnished
anti-slavery advocates with strong arguments that slavery, although sanctioned by positive
law, was contrary to the fundamental postulates on which the Republic was founded. 1 °
This reliance on eighteenth century natural law principles also contributed to a focus on
race and citizenship in the eighteenth century. The awareness that free blacks were
regarded as citizens and that they were permitted to vote in most states in the late
eighteenth century made advocates of abolition and equal rights all the more aware of
ground lost in the nineteenth century. 2 " This realization played a major part in the
thinking that shaped both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment.
If the fourteenth amendment should, in general, be interpreted in light of the
natural law views of anti-slavery advocates, the privileges and immunities clause should he
examined in light of what were generally viewed as the incidents of citizenship in post
Civil War America. Berger's view of a generally understood limited view of the term
privileges and immunities fails to take into account the tremendous expansion of rights
204 Id. at 225-28. The fourteenth amendment did not make citizens of Indians who were subject
to tribal authority, "Indians not taxed." Those Indians who were outside of tribal authority and lived
amongst the general population were made citizens by the amendment. Id.
2" Id. at 223-24.
2116 R.M. COVER, JUSTICE, ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 830 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as J usTicE Accuseni.
207
2" EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 17-18, 94.
2" Id. at 17-18.
2in Id.
'" Id. See supra notes 182 and 189.
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that had taken place during the nineteenth century. While the federal Bill of Rights did
not apply to the states, most stale constitutions included provisions that paralleled the
rights found in the first eight arnendments.'21 ' Universal white manhood suffrage had
been achieved in every state.' 3
 Broad agreement existed concerning the rights of Amer-
ican citizens, agreement that by 1866 would have included most of the rights found in the
Constitution. Ironically, Taney's enumeration of the rights of citizens in Dred Scott, which
was a partial recitation of the federal Bill of Rights, may constitute one of the more visible
examples of what were generally viewed to be the rights of citizens during this period.""
The desire of the framers of the fourteenth amendment to protect Unionists in
southern states must also be accounted for in any discussion of the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause. John Bingham pointed to the South's violation of the
free speech rights of anti-slavery advocates before the Civil War as one mischief he
believed the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause would remedy,' 15
Whatever Bingham's previous confusion concerning the applicability of the Bill of Rights
to the states, he clearly desired to bring about that result through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Nor was he alone. Others argued the need to protect loyalists, black and white,
from revenge and restrictions by southern state governments."" Many in the Thirty-ninth
Congress were particularly concerned with Alabama's prohibition on blacks bearing
arms." Opponents of the fourteenth amendment argued, as they had in opposing the
Civil Rights Act. of 1866, that the amendment. furnished the basis for federal intrusion
into the activities of state governments. They also argued, correctly, that the old
federalism of virtually absolute state sovereignty with respect to individual rights was
being irrevocably altered."
Opponents also charged that the amendment was ambiguously worded, designed to
permit broad constructions.' That charge may be of more value in discerning the
meaning of the amendment than Berger cares to admit. The fourteenth amendment was
a product of growth and compromise. A child of the anti-slavery movement, the four-
teenth amendment would have died stillborn had that movement's views not been but-
tressed by general northern alarm over the South's attempts to nullify the verdict of the
war and by growing resentment of the pro-southern sympathies of Andrew Johnson."" If
211 ERIEDNIAN, supra note 100, at 103-09, 303-04.
21 ' EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 6-8; THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra DOIC 166, at
467.
'2 ' 4 Taney argued that blacks, slave or free, were not citizens because they were denied rights
commonly granted to citizens, "and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak: to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went." tired Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) at 417.
' 15 RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, SUpra note 169, at 200-01; DEBATES. supra note 169, at 156-59,
217-18. Bingham incidentally appears to have been less confused about the applicability of the Bill of
Rights to the states than Berger indicates. Bingham was aware of the Court's decision in Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833) that held that the fifth amendment did not apply to the states.
He realized the state of the law and he disagreed with it. While Bingham argued that, in his view, the
Court had misinterpreted the intent of the framers with respect to the Bill of Rights and its
applicability to the states, he argued that the fourteenth amendment would correct that decision. See
Bingham's remarks on February 28, 1866, reported in DEBATES, supra note 169, at 159-60.
21 ' DEBATES, supra note 169, at 149, 155, 156.
2" EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, supra note 31, at 405.
' I ' DEBATES, supra note 169, at 149-61.
215 id ,
22" See supra notes 31 and 169.
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the radical agenda was not fully incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, neither
was that agenda repudiated. The amendment adopted general language granting the
federal government then revolutionary new powers to inquire into the state's treatment of
its citizens. Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the amendment's general language was
designed to allow for an evolution of approach, one that would permit inquiry into new
circumstances and new state encroachments on the rights of citizens."'
Finally, it should be recognized that any examination of the fourteenth amendment
that focuses exclusively on events prior to and during the passage of that amendment is
necessarily incomplete. Such an approach fails to consider the amendment as part of the
ongoing process by which the once idiosyncratic egalitarianism of the abolitionists became
the law of the land. As an early opinion by the Court on the fourteenth amendment
reminds us, that amendment should be construed with a view towards the compelling
implications of the amendment's provisions and by a holistic examination of Reconstruc-
tion era legislation including the fifteenth amendment. In Strauder v. West Virginia, the
Court struck down a West Virginia statute restricting jury duty to whites as violative of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause."' The Court in Strauder, and the other
cases following its line of reasoning, 73 recognized early on an important point largely
absent in Berger's analysis. To give full effect to the intentions of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court must go beyond the details of whether or not the
amendment was specifically designed to confer this right or protect that privilege and
inquire into whether or not a state's practice is inconsistent with the concepts of citizen-
ship and equal protection that were the central concerns of those who authored the
constitutional revolution in race relations and federalism in the years following the Civil
War.
IV. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka: The Compelling Corollary
The Thirty-ninth Congress, whatever the views of its more radical members, proba-
bly did not plan to abolish school segregation. They did, however, intend to establish
equality of treatment before the law, That was their overriding purpose in drafting the
fourteenth amendment, a purpose that has been acknowledged even by the defenders of
segregation in the major cases dealing with that issue."' What is important for any
discussion of the Supreme Court's rulings on desegregation is not instances of the
Thirty-ninth Congress' acceptance of segregation, amply detailed in Government By
Judiciary. Instead, what is critical is the law they enacted, the fourteenth amendment, its
fundamental purpose, and whether the Court reasonably and properly decided that state
mandated segregation was at odds with fundamental constitutional doctrine. This issue is
less a question of whether changes in social mores should be given constitutional effect
than it is a question of whether or not the Court is properly empowered to take into
account experience. There also is a question, critical to any examination of Berger's
thesis: should law be measured strictly by its nominal, formally stated objectives or by its
persistent effects, in essence its behavior?
Those who drafted the fourteenth amendment knew a great deal about inequality
and almost nothing concerning equality before the law. That was inevitable. Before the
22 ' See supra note 135.
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
23 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
924 See infra notes 243-70 and accompanying text.
376	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:353
Civil War, scarcely a handful of states made even an arguable pretense of treating black
and white equally before the law."s In the vast majority of states, blacks, even if free, were
decidedly unequal before the law, The South, home of 95% of the nation's black popula-
tion, enforced a vigorous nonequality between the races, designed to protect the institu-
tion or slavery.==' There was little experience based on a presumption of legal equality
between the races to inform the framers of the fourteenth amendment of all the necessary
implications of the revolutionary doctrine they were developing.'"
In the specific area of education the framers also suffered from a severe paucity of
information. The vast majority of blacks lived in the South, a region where before the
Civil War it was illegal to teach most blacks to read.'" It was a region where little effort
was made to educate the children of poor whites; the common school movement came late
to the South..1" Schools in the North were largely segregated, but before the passage of
the fourteenth amendment, even the most enlightened northern states were not operat-
ing under a presumption, much less a mandate, of equal treatment before the law." 30 It
should also be added that few at the time were inclined to make comparisons of the
relative qualities of white and black schools."' In education, as in most other areas, the
framers of the fourteenth amendment simply had little experience to help them decide
whether the equality before the law that they were mandating was inconsistent with
segregation.'"
Time brought experience. By the end of the nineteenth century, southern state
legislatures, freed by a national weariness and lack of concern with the issue of race, wrote
a new segregation into the laws of many states,'" These laws helped create a segregation
far more detailed than anything that had existed in the antebellum era.'" This new
segregation was far more extensive than anything that would have been tolerated during
Reconstruction.'" It was an American apartheid labeled with the somewhat whimsical
title of Jim Crow.'" At its zenith, this American apartheid exceeded even the wildest
The New England slates came relatively close to establishing de jure equality between black
and white before the Civil War. Nonetheless legal discrimination existed in the New England states;
school segregation existed in parts of New England; black men, except for those in Rhode Island,
could not serve in the militia; Connecticut withheld the vote from black men until after the Civil War.
Pervasive social and economic discrimination existed in antebellum New England, despite the
relative liberality of New England's laws. For two studies that examine black urban life in antebellum
New England, see THE AFRO-YANKEES, supra note 183, and J. & L. HORTON, BLACK BOSTONIANS:
FAMILY LIFE ANI) COMMUNITY STRUGGLE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (1979) thereinafter cited as
BLACK BOSTONIANS].
22"
 See supra note 175.
2' 7 See infra notes 22811.
22 ' FROM SLAVERY To FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 156-57.
2" Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954).
"36 See supra note 225.
231
 In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the two New England states that came close to recogniz-
ing black equality under law, the condition of black schools was an issue in antebellum attempts to
integrate the school systems. See BLACK BOSTONIANS, Supra note 225, at 70-76; THE AFRO-YANKEES,
supra note 183, at 90-101.
See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
2" C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3rd ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW].
2'4 Id. at 67-109.
2:15
' Woodward informs us that the term had its origins in an antebellum song and dance act. See
id. at 7.
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dreams of its late nineteenth century originators.'" Blacks and whites were separated, by
law, in every measurable facet of public life. The extensive list of legally mandated
separations almost constituted a reduction ad absurdum argument against the seg-
regationist practices emerging in the South at the turn of the century. 238
Still the laws were passed and enforced. 239 Such laws were coterminus with, and part
of, the process of restoring total white rule to the South." 4° From the beginning, suppor-
ters of equal rights recognized this legislation as an attempt to reinvigorate the southern
caste system, a system critically wounded by northern imposed emancipation, made more
critical by an egalitarian Reconstruction and still on the sick list in the 1880's and 1890's
because of lingering black political power."'' The law was designed to single out blacks as a
group apart, to reinforce views of black inferiority, to provide a constant reminder of
subordinate status, to provide the supporting ritual necessary to any caste system. 242
Early on the issue was joined. In their brief against Louisiana's statute mandating
segregation on railroad cars, attorneys for Plessy v. Ferguson'a 3 argued that the real issue in
the case was not whether or not the railroad provided essentially equal facilities when they
237 id ,
Id. at 68-69.
25 Such laws were numerous; some examples follow:
Use of Library.
Any white person of such county may use the county free library under the rules and
regulations prescribed by the commissioners court and may be entitled to all the
privileges thereof. Said court shall make proper provision for the negroes of said
county to be served through a separate branch or branches of the county free library,
which shall be administered by custodian of the negro race under supervision of the
county librarian.
TEX. REV. Cry. STAT., art. 1688 (Vernon 1962), repealed by 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws Ch. 130, I.
Separate ticket offices and entrances for white and colored races; penalty:
All circuses, shows and tent exhibitions, to which the public of more than one race is
invited or at which it is expected to attend, shall provide for the convenience of its
patrons not less than two ticket sellers and not less than two entrances to the perfor-
, mane, with individual ticket takers and receivers. In the case of outside or tent
performances these ticket offices shall not be less than twenty-five feet apart. One of the
entrances shall be exclusively for persons of the colored race.
Any proprietor, manager, ticket seller, or employee connected with any show, tent
exhibition, or circus, who violates this section, or who is found admitting and receiving
persons of several races in the same entrance, shall be fined not more than twenty-five
dollars, and in default of payment shall be imprisoned for thirty days.
LA. REV. STAT. Axx. § 4:5 (West 1973), repealed by 1975 La. Acts 638, § 3.
Separation of white and colored races.
A. All public parks, recreation centers, play-grounds, community centers and other
such facilities at which swimming, dancing, golfing, skating or other recreational ac-
tivities are conducted shall he operated separately for members of the white and
colored races. This shall not preclude mixed audiences at such facilities, provided
separated sections and rest room facilities are reserved for members of white and
colored races. This provision is made in the exercise of the state's police power and for
the purpose of protecting the public health, morals and the peace and good order in
the state and not because of race.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 4:451 to 4:455 (West 1973), repealed by 1972, La. Acts 254, § 1.
1411 THE STRANC.E CAREER OF JIM CROW, supra note 233. at 67-109, passim.
24 ' Id. at 31-65.
'4 ' Codifying Caste, supra note 182, at 260-61.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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separated black and white,' It was instead the legal disparagement, the state mandated
reiteration of black inferiority that. segregation enforced. 24'
One of Plessy's attorneys, James C. Walker, framed the issue most cogently, His brief
contended that the power to designate individuals as black or white, a critical issue in
Plessy v. Ferguson' because Plessy was seven-eigths white, was the power to make a radical
determination of an individual's chances in life.'" Walker further argued that the state's
assumption of the power to make legal racial distinctions was inconsistent with the free
and formally equal status that blacks enjoyed under the law, such a power was only
consistent with a legal assumption of inferiority.'" Walker claimed that Louisiana's
classification and assignment of railway passengers by race was a practice reminiscent of
the defunct slave regime, a badge of slavery at sharp variance with the dictates of the
thirteenth amendment.'" That the purpose of the Louisiana railroad statute was to
reinforce notions of black inferiority was clear, and Walker bolstered this view by pointing
to the sole exception that that law made.'S0 Black nurses accompanying white children
were permitted to ride in white cars.' S1 The law would tolerate no mixing of blacks with
the general population unless their subordinate status was unquestionable.""
Louisiana's attorneys and ultimately the Court, rejected the arguments made by
Plessy's attorneys?' But even their rejections may have framed the issue in such a way as
to make compelling the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,' S4 fifty-eight
years later. The attorneys presenting Louisiana's case rejected the psychological and
sociological arguments offered by Plessy's attorneys:" 5 Still they and the Court agreed
that the fourteenth amendment required equality of treatment by the state.'" Attorneys
for Louisiana stressed that the coach facilities designated for black passengers were
substantially equal to the facilities provided for white ones.'" Although they maintained
that facilities need not be identical, Louisiana's attorneys conceded that substantial
equality was required, that the fourteenth amendment would not be satisfied if the state
attempted to provide unequal facilities."' The Court accepted Louisiana's theory of the
case. Messy permitted separation, but it also mandated substantial equality of treatment.'"
In the years between Plessy and Brown, southern states and quite a few non-southern
states vigorously accepted the first part of the Plessy doctrine, separation, while ignoring
the second part, equality, with an equal vigor. This essay is not the place to focus on the
"4
 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARCUMENTS OF THE SUPREME, COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Briefs for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, at 3-135 (P. Kurland and C.
Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter all cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS].
2" Id.
246 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
247 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, at 36.
"g Id. at 38.
249 Id.
as
1"' Id. at 46.
2" Id.
2" Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
r 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see supra note 3.
2S' 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Defendants in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, at
143.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id .
' I) See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549-50.
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manifest inequalities that accompanied de jure segregation, still it should be stressed that
such inequalitieS were well known before the decision in Brown." In the field of educa-
tion, the systematic denial to black students of physically equal facilities, 2 " 1 similarly
qualified teachers?'" and adequate textbooks"' alone could have been the basis for a
compelling claim that segregation and equality were not compatible in fact, even if' the two
were theoretically reconcilable. Prior to Brown, the Court had decided to go beyond mere
state assertions of equality in university education into an examination of the facilities
actually available to white and black students. In Sweat! v. Painter 264 and McLaun'n v.
Oklahoma the Court found that the separate facilities available to black university
students did not meet the substantial equality test enunciated in Plessy. The Court ordered
Oklahoma and Texas to admit black students to state university facilities. 2"
Still the plaintiffs in Brown did not rest their complaint on a detailing of the obvious
inequalities found in segregated school systems. Instead their complaint was essentially an
updating of Plessy's complaint, an assertion that segregation constituted a stigmatization
of black students, a stigmatization that not only reinforced white notions of black inferior-
ity, but one that all too often resulted in black internalization of such notions as wel1. 267
Buttressed by the social sciences, which had matured considerably in the years between
Plessy and Brown, the advocates of desegregation won a decision declaring de jure segrega-
tion in education incompatible with the fourteenth amendment.
Berger's criticism of that decision in Government By Judiciary is a criticism that eschews
consideration of the amendment's fundamental purposes in favor of an examination of
the past that fails to illuminate the issue presented. The record presented in Brown,
indeed the record of legally mandated segregation in early years of the twentieth century
is clear. The Jim Crow laws and state practices, of which school segregation was a major
part, were designed to perpetuate sentiments of white supremacy, to reinforce an Amer-
ican caste system.' They were applied in a manner calculated to make such sentiments
self-fulfilling prophecies. Those intentions and practices have proven incompatible with
the fundamental purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Yet, Berger's reasoning would have required the Court to ignore practices of state
governments designed to perpetuate inequality before the law, an inequality that even
segregation's defenders acknowledged was inconsistent with the fourteenth amend-
ment,'" Berger would substitute for Brown's inquiry into actual state practices a mode of
analysis incapable of going beyond a mechanical examination of state law, a facial scrutiny
"O A number of sociological studies had documented the inequalities of segregated society in
the United States. Perhaps the most famous at the time the Court was considering Brown was the
study done by Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal and his associates. See G. MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
261
	 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at 946-52 (vol. 2).
2" Id.
263 Id.
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
2" 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
'" Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636; MeLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.
49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Brief's for Appellants, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, at 4.
See supra notes 156-67.
'69 See 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Defendants in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson at
118-22; 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Appellees, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, at 83-88.
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with the limited objective of discovering whether a state's statute specifically contravened
a practice the Thirty-ninth Congress meant to outlaw," 7° Such a limited inquiry would
make an empty shell of the fourteenth amendment's guarantees, a thin shield of protec-
tion for individual liberties, easily circumvented by any state official intelligent enough to
present a statute that was not constitutionally offensive on its face. Such an approach
would sacrifice the Court's ability, indeed responsibility, to insure individual liberty to the
punctilious demands of an empty formalism.
V. IS IT STILT, NECESSARY TO HANG A VILLAIN, WHIP H I M OR EVEN CUT HIS EARS Ctt:F ?
A strict, if not empty, formalism, combined with a rigid assertion that constitutional
provisions must be interpreted with an exclusive reference to the specific problems the
framers intended to address appears to be Berger's yardstick for assessing the constitu-
tionality of state actions and the Court's review of those actions. His criticism of the Court
in Death Penalties rejects any role for the Court in capital cases that would extend beyond
an excruciatingly narrow reading of state statutes to determine whether or not they are
discriminatory on their face. Berger rejects the view that systematic discrimination in the
application of the death penalty is proper cause for the Court's concern.'" He also
disparages the notion that changing social circumstances can move the demands of the
eighth amendment beyond the eighteenth century catalogue of horrors that gave rise to
that amendment's adoption."'"
Berger's discussion of the fourteenth amendment's implications in capital cases is,
perhaps, more disturbing than his eighth amendment argument. Berger's assertion that
the fourteenth amendment was riot designed to "save an undoubtedly guilty black mur-
derer from the death penalty because a jury had sentenced a white to life imprison-
ment,"273
 is fundamentally beside the point. The thrust of the abolitionist argument with
respect to discrimination and the death penalty has not been an individual one, a claim
that racial prejudice in isolated cases has permitted the occasional execution of black
murdererS while permitting the occasional white murderer to escape with a lesser pen-
alty.•" Instead the abolitionists have contended, backed by abundant statistical evidence,
that the administration of the death penalty has been rife with discrimination." 5
 From the
initial decision of prosecutors who determine whether a defendant should be charged
with capital or noncapital homicide, to the decisions of judges and jurors who determine
sentencing, through the reviews by appellate courts, and finally in the deliberations of
governors and pardoning authorities, the question of who is killed and who is spared has
been determined to a frightening, perhaps constitutionally impermissible, degree by race,
class, sex and other criteria by which Americans discriminate."" Berger's failure to
270 See supra notes 42-49.
27 ' DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 9, at 53 - 58.
2." Id.
"3 Id. at 57.
274
 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Appellant-Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, at
397, 477.
2" 73 LANDMARK BRIEF'S, supra note 244, Brief for NAACP amicus curiae, Furman v. Georgia, at
375, 465, 719.
2" Id. Hanz Zeisel argues that the prosecutor is key in this process. Prosecutors have almost
unlimited discretion in deciding whether to charge a suspect with a capital or noncapital felony and
whether, in the former case, to press for a death sentence if a conviction occurs. See Zeisel, Race Bias
in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 H A RV. L. REV. 456, at 466-67 (1981)
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recognize that this pattern raises critical fourteenth amendment questions that the Court.
could not properly ignore is a serious one.
Nowhere is this failure more glaring than in Berger's discussion of the death penalty
for rape. Death Penalties criticizes the Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia.'" In Colter, the
Court ruled that the death penalty for rape violated the eighth amendment because it was
disproportionate to the offense.'" Berger's discussion here is far too brief'. Totally absent.
from Berger's argument is any acknowledgment that the twentieth century application of
the death penalty for rape has been so severely tainted by racism as to call it into serious
question on both eighth amendment and equal protection grounds. Although Coker was
one of the rare white rapists condemned for his crime, part of the Court's background
when it decided Coker was evidence introduced by his attorneys and also previously
introduced in Furman v. Georgia."' That evidence showed that black men convicted of
raping white women in southern states were virtually alone in being executed for their
crimes. Nearly 90% of those executed between the years 1930 and 1967 for rape were
black,'" Such a pattern raises serious equal protection problems that might legitimately
concern the Court.
That pattern also poses serious eighth amendment problems. In twentieth century
America, executions for rape have been so peculiarly linked to race and region as to call
into serious question the public acceptability of a generalized death penalty for the crime.
Public sentiment had decided through innumerable decisions that, as a general rule,
death was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape. Statutes prescribing the
death penalty for rape could only survive enforcement by virtue of a suspiciously limited
application. Attorneys for Coker argued that the twentieth century history of the death
penalty for rape did not. indicate general support. for it as a penal measure, but instead
principally as a means of racial control."' The Court was aware of this history. It was also
aware that of the states that re-enacted capital punishment after Furman, Georgia was
alone in providing the death penalty for the rape of an adult female.' The peculiar
application of the death penalty for rapists before Furman and the virtual nationwide
legislative abolition of rape's capital status after, furnished strong evidence that the death
penalty for rape was no longer consonant with the evolved American sense of justice.'" 3
That evolved or evolving sense of justice is central to the dilemma. Berger would limit
the Court's eighth amendment analysis to the sensibilities of the framers."' And his
.
(hereinafter cited as Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty); see also Greenberg. Capital
Punishment as a System, 91 KALE L.J. 908 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Capital Punishment as a System].
"" 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
" 8 Id.
279 97 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Petitioner - Appellant, Coker v. Georgia, at
796-97; 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Appellant-Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, at
464.
28° 97 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 294, Briefs for Petitioner-Appellant. Coker v. Georgia, at
796-97; 73 LANDMARK BR/EFS, SUP/I1 note 244, Briefs for Appellant-Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, at
464.
28 ' 97 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244. Briefs for Petitioner-Appellant, Coker v, Georgia, at
796.97; 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Appellant-Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, at
464.
' 82 97 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Petitioner-Appellant, Coker U. Georgia, at
798-99.
'"3 Id.
2" See DEATH PENAL:1.1Es, supra note 9, at 29-58.
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research documenting eighteenth century hangings and dismembering of major crimi-
nals and petty miscreants provides abundant evidence that the capital crimes of today
would survive the scrutiny of the framers. 2" The Court, however, has recognized, and
properly so, that its eighth amendment inquiries should not he confined to a simple
comparison of current statutes with eighteenth century punishments.' The Court's
evolving standards approach is almost inherent in the language of the amendment. This
attribute was recognized when the amendment was proposed. Livermore's lament during
the debate over the amendment's ratification should serve as a reminder that even
eighteenth century sensibilities recognized cruelty in the death penalty."' There is addi-
tional evidence on this point. Juries in eighteenth century England often avoided the
harshness of the prevailing criminal code by refusing to convict defendants in spite of
strong evidence.'"" Benefit of Clergy was, despite its inherent class discrimination, one
device that permitted courts to spare lives.'"`' English convicts were often banished to the
Americas in an effort to spare judge and felon the horrors of the extreme penalty. 29° Still
Livermore believed the penalty necessary and the widespread existence of laws in the
eighteenth century prescribing death for numerous crimes should convince us that many
of Livermore's contemporaries agreed with his view. That common agreement should
alert us to the reason for the relative rarity of the death penalty in modern Ainerica. It
should also inform us on why the Court has properly used the eighth amendment to
subject capital punishment to a more rigorous scrutiny than that amendment's framers
employed.
Death was a frequent punishment in the eighteenth century world because few
alternatives existed, Those few alternatives usually involved either corporal punishment
or banishment.. Crime and criminal justice in eighteenth century America took place in a
world where long term imprisonment was essentially unknown."' In the nineteenth
century, often at the prompting of religious reformers anxious to provide an alternative
to the death penalty, states began establishing penitentiaries.'`' This movement to substi-
tute imprisonment for capital punishment began in the northeastern states before the
Civil War.'39 ' By the end of the nineteenth century some provision for long term impris-
onment existed in every state,' With the realization of an alternative to execution,
Y,5
2" For the Court's earliest use of the evolving standards approach, sec Justice McKenna's
opinion in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357-82 (1909).
2" This recognition was pointed out by one of Berger's critics, long -time abolitionist Hugo
Adam Bedau. See Bedau, Berger's Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the Constitution, 81 MicH.
L. Rev. 1152, 1160 (1983). Bedau suggests that Livermore's remarks should cause the Court to
construct a balancing test for capital punishment. As the absence of long-term imprisonment made
death a necessary, albeit cruel, punishment in the eighteenth century, the existence of long - term
correctional facilities in the twentieth century does away with the necessity for capital punishment,
and hence, its cruelty is no longer constitutionally justifiable. Id.
.2" See generally D. HAY, P. LINEF1AUGH4 RULE, F.P. TuompsoN, & C. WINSLOW, AMMON 'S FATAL
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1975); Baker, Criminal Courts and
Procedures at Common Law, in IS. COCKBURN, CRIME. IN ENGLAND 1550-1880 (1977).
2$9 DEATH PENALTIES, Supra note 9, at 35, 42.
'9" See supra note 288.
'"' See generally D. j . ROTHMAN, TIIE DISCOVERY or THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC (1977); [hereinafier cited as THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM),
"2 FRIEDMAN, supra IMIC 100, at 249-51, 259-61.
293 Id .
"' Id. at 517-24.
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sentiment concerning the purposes of punishment changed. Traditional beliefs about the
retributive and deterrent effects of punishment were supplemented with a new rationale.
The idea developed that somehow the prison experience might contribute to the refor-
mation of felons, what we today would term rehabilitation?' If some of the methods and
theories employed in nineteenth century American penal institutions to effect this refor-
mation seem today at once astonishingly naive and appallingly primitive, it nonetheless
must be remembered that the penitentiary contributed to significant changes in public
sentiment?" That changed sentiment brought about the abolition of capital punishment.
in some states?' It reduced the number of capital crimes in all states.' When America
entered the twentieth century, death was no longer the routine penalty exacted for most
offenses?" Increasingly, it was reserved for those crimes and criminals deemed most
reprehensible. 30"
As the twentieth century unfolded, the use of the death penalty became rarer." This
trend was not constant."' The 1930's saw an increase in the number of executions,
reaching a nationwide highpoint in 1935 when 199 executions occurred."" Still the long
range trend indicated a sharp decline in the willingness of state and federal governments
to kill offenders. 304 After the Second World War, particularly in the sixties, the downward
trend accelerated.""" By 1967, the year the Court imposed a moratorium on executions to
consider challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment, only two executions
were performed iri the United States.'"
This downward trend partly reflected, as supporters of the death penalty have
maintained, the increased appellate scrutiny that capital cases received. 307 It also reflected
American society's increasing reluctance to apply the death penalty." 8 By the time the
Court considered Furman, only a small minority of those convicted of murder received
death sentences.' Opponents of the death penalty argued that this indicated that capital
punishment was incompatible with modern American views on justice, that the punish-
ment was such that it could only be applied if applied rarely, to minority groups and the
poor, to those who were outcasts even among the population of murderers."'" Such
application, the abolitionists contended, was inconsistent with the eighth amendmerit.. 3 " It
was an argument that asked the Court to look beyond statutes permitting or mandating
the death penalty and instead make a painstaking inquiry into the operation of law.
In Furman, the Court, in part, made such an inquiry. The opinions that struck down
then existing capital statutes were informed by strong evidence and persuasive arguments
'9' Id.
209 Id.
207 Id.
298 Id.
250 Id.
300 Id.
30 ' 73 LANnstARK BRIEFS, supra note 244, Briefs for Petitioners, Furman v. Georgia, at 374-75.
3°2
 Id.
sos Id.
304 Id.
305 Id .
Id.
"7 hi. at 577.
3101
3"" Id. at 373-75.
3 ") Id.
311 Id.
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indicating that the actual implementation of the death penalty was seriously marred by a
highly arbitrary application. 312
 Compelling evidence existed that race and class played
equal if not greater roles than the heinousness of an individual's crime in determining
capital sentencing.'" Finally, and this became the governing doctrine in Furman, then
existing capital statutes provided no guidelines that would inform juries when capital
sentences might appropriately be considered.'" in a society where the death penalty had
become the exception rather than the rule, the Court demanded that states give some
indication which combination of heinous crime and individual depravity might properly
permit the jury to authorize the state to take a life.'
Furman was a somewhat conservative decision that did far less damage to the death
penalty than many first believed.'" It immediately met with strong criticism. Dissenting
members of the Court anticipated many of Berger's complaints.'" Chief Justice Burger
argued for an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause that went
somewhat beyond the framers' views, but fell far short of the doctrine developed in
Furman . 3" The Chief Justice admitted that the terms cruel and unusual were not self-
defining and could take into account contemporary mores, when clear.3 L 9 He for exam-
ple, indicated that the Court could ban branding and ear-cropping, despite the preva-
lence of such punishments in the eighteenth century because society today clearly rejected
such sanctions. 3'-0 Nonetheless, he dismissed the idea that the death penalty was prohib-
ited because of its freakish imposition as "unwarranted hyperbole."' Justice Powell saw
the decision as having grave consequences for stare decisis, federalism, judicial restraint
and separation of powers.'" Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued for judicial restraint. He
3" See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
3'3
	 at 251-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
31.1 Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
31 ' See, e.g., id, at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
310 Many commentators believed that Furman would, for all practical purposes, make capital
punishment impossible in the United States. This view appears to have been the initial conclusion of
Chief Justice Warren Burger. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Burger is said to have
expressed the view, at the time of the decision, that Furman effectively eliminated capital punishment
in the United States. See THE BRETHREN, supra note 2, at 219. Although states immediately moved to
reinstate the death penalty, drafting capital statutes designed to satisfy guidelines put forth in
Furman, the constitutionality of such statutes remained in doubt until the Court's ruling in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the Court sustained Georgia's capital
sentencing statute, noting that it differed from pre-Furman laws. Id. at 206-07. The new statute
required two phases in capital trials: the first determined guilt or innocence, the second determined
penalty. Id. at 196-98. The Court also noted that the statute provided sufficient guidance forjuries to
satisfy the Furman standards. Id. at 197 -98. Since Gregg, the number of executions performed in the
United States has steadily increased. In 1977, one year after Gregg, the single person executed in the
United States, Gary Gilmore, refused to appeal his death sentence. No executions occurred in 1978;
two were performed in 1979, and none in 1980. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 25
(3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA]. The great increase in execu-
tions has come since 1981. As of March 21, 1985, 41 executions had occurred in the post-Gregg era,
38 of these executions occurring between 1981 and 1985. See Murderer Electrocuted in Georgia, Said His
Race "Was Against" Him, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1985, at B24, col. 5.
317 See infra text accompanying notes 318-24.
3 " See Furman , 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3 ' 9 Id. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"11 Id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
322 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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indicated that the decision called into sharp question the role of judicial review in a
democratic society.' justice Blackmun accepted the idea that the terms cruel and unusual
might take on new meaning as society developed. He argued that the new meaning was
better expressed through legislative action instead of the Court's decisions.'
After Furman, states moved quickly to re-establish the death penalty, providing
guidelines for capital sentencing to meet the Court's constitutional objections.' On one
level Berger is correct in his assertion that this action furnishes strong evidence of public
support for capital punishment. But the arguments of Berger and other retentionists
should cause us, and the Court, again to make the difficult inquiry, distinguishing
between formal law and the law as actually applied before we too readily accept the idea
that the death penalty is consonant with contemporary American values. Berger makes
certain assumptions concerning the death penalty. He sees "undoubtedly guilty murder-
ers" escaping execution after "fair trials" because of the Court's inteli, entions.'" Other
retentionists argue that society has the right, for either deterrence or retribution, to exact
the extreme penalty for the most heinous crimes.''
These assumptions express an opinion concerning the kind of death penalty that is
consistent with current American values. It is an opinion that assumes less a generalized
support for the death penalty than a support strongly rooted in certain assumptions of
due process and selectivity. It is a set of assumptions still, despite Furman, at variance with
the actual application of capital statutes. 3'8 Public assumptions concerning due process,
the fair trials received by murder suspects, are inconsistent with strong evidence that
those ending up on the nation's death rows are overwhelmingly poor men forced to
entrust their lives in trial to often marginal counsel.' The idea that death sentences are
reserved for society's most depraved criminals, those who must be disposed of, cannot be
reconciled with the execution of murderers who would have received sentences far lighter
than imprisonment for life had they accepted offered pica bargains.'" Such disparities
'3 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3" See Furman, 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' DE:Arti PENALTIES, supra note 9, at 125.
" Id. at 57.
'27 For two supporters of this view, see W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME. AND THE
MORALITY OF TIIE DEATH PENALTY (1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG &IP. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
DEBATE (1983).
"g Id.
320 Capital Punishment as a System, supra note 276, at 912; Clark, Rush to Death, 229 THE NATION
385 (1979).
' See Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty, supra note 276, at 466-67; Lewis, Killing
the Killers.' A Post Furman Profile of Florida's Condemned, 25 CRIME AND DELINQ. 200, 204-05 (1979);
Amnesty International, Proposal for a Presidential Commission on the Death Penalty in the United States of
America, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 316, at 380.
For three recent examples of convicted murderers who turned down plea bargains that would
have resulted in life sentences and were subsequently condemned to death, see Arango v. State, 437
S.2d 1099 (Fla. 1983), vacated and remanded sub nom. Arango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (1 Rh Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1140 (1982); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1458 (1984); Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1983). Of the three, James
David Autry was executed on March 14, 1984, Luis Carlos Arango is still appealing his death
sentence and Arthur Frederick Goode has been removed from Florida's death row and placed in a
mental institution.
According to a 1984 Justice Department study, the median time actually served by convicted
murderers sentenced to life imprisonment was a little over five years. See Reskin, Majority of Lawyers
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are, of course, present in noncapital sentencing and perhaps must be borne in the
interests of systemic efficiencies and economies, but to permit their continuation in capital
cases belies the belief shared by abolitionists and retentionists alike that death is different.
Such disparities also raise important questions concerning whether or not the apparent
public acceptance of the death penalty is based on a woeful ignorance of its actual
application, an ignorance which if rectified would bring about a demand for either radical
change Or abolition.
And although Berger would contend that such questions are properly raised by
legislatures and not the Court,' 3 ' the issue is still properly a matter for judicial concern. If
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is to have any meaning, it must take that
meaning from society's changed circumstances, from both evolved needs and sentiments.
The framers authored the cruel and unusual punishment clause fully mindful of the
existence of a judicial branch that could and likely would shape the demands of that
clause to changing circumstances.'." They did not essay a list proscribing, boiling in oil,
crucifixion and the other horrors with which they were familiar. If their intention, to
safeguard even the most despised from punishments shocking to the public conscience, is
to be given hill effect, the Court will continue to be troubled with capital cases.
VI. SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout Government By Judiciary and Death Penalties, Berger's often prodigious
scholarship is marred by an all too facile consideration of the materials he has developed.
Both studies suffer from a rigid literalism that prevents the author from looking beyond
the printed word to considerations of actual practice. Berger's work also lacks a sense of
history capable of accommodating growth and change in individuals, society, or the law.
There is a readily apparent self-confidence in Berger's work that has led to his uncritical
acceptance and vigorous assertion of his own assumptions, with a failure to consider
alternatives or to explore evidence contrary to his thesis. Such deficiencies are unfortu-
nate because there are important issues concerning history, original understandings, and
the Court's processes that must be addressed. Legal historians, perhaps especially conser-
vative ones like Berger, have an important role to play in reminding an all too often
result-oriented bench, bar, and public of the need to retain continuity with original
intentions.
Support Capital Punishment, in A.B.A. J., April, 1985, at 44. The knowledge that life sentences
frequently result in relatively' short-term imprisonment has long been a staple of the retentionist
argument. There is evidence that support for capital punishment declines significantly when life
imprisonment without parole is offered as an alternative. See id.
Because life sentences usually result in short-term imprisonment, retentionists argue that life
sentences leave the public unprotected. Murderers are paroled and are capable of killing again. See
Amsterdam, Capital YU nishment , in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 316, at 353-54. The
argument can also be made that because most murderers are, in effect, sentenced to short-term
imprisonment, the contrast between murderers condemned to death and those sentenced to prison is
even starker than would be the case if those sentenced to life actually served out their full terms. This
disparity makes questions concerning how the death row population is selected even more compel-
ling.
3' 1
 DEATH PENAL:DES, supra note 9, at 48-49.
112
 Eighth amendment opponent Samuel Livermore, for example, believed that common
eighteenth century punishment might one day be abolished because of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. See notes 75, 287.
March 1985]
	
BRITTLE JURISPRUDENCE	 387
In a very real sense, the more interesting problem is the one Berger has failed to
address, perhaps even to consider. It is not the problem of gathering in minute detail the
debates of the framers and shackling Constitution and Court to those discussions. The
problem instead is to recognize that common-law processes are inherent in constitutional
interpretation, while attempting to develop limits that prevent those processes from doing
violence to the framers' intentions. It is a problem that acknowledges that a too pliable
constitution is no constitution at all, while a too brittle one is too fragile to endure.
